

GAP ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION: THE CASE OF DUFIL PRIMA FOODS, OTA, OGUN STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study investigated gaps in workers' motivational desires and employers' provisions in order to reveal the extent to which desires were either in balance, deficient or excessive compared against what employers' often provide. The size of the gap in-between, rather than the absolute size of the motivation provided was justified as the determinant of effective motivation. It was a single case study of a manufacturing company, Dufil Prima Foods (Nig.) Plc. Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria. Perceptual data measured on a 5-point Likert Scale were collected via a survey by questionnaire. Paired samples mean difference tests were conducted to identify significant gaps between motivational desires and provisions. The results were fitted into some selected theoretical models and analyzed. The study found the greatest mismatch on the content factors of the Herzberg framework as well as the physiological, safety and self-actualization levels of the Maslow triangle. Consequently, drawing from knowledge on the social exchange theory, the study suggested enhanced periodic communication and feedback with employees. This is to prevent "waste" of expenditures on motivational provisions that are of little value to employees, and are hence incapable of instigating commitment and loyalty to jobs and organizations. The study therefore recommended a new social exchange theory of motivation. The work is significant as it draws attention to the balancing factor in making motivation penny-wise and effective.

Keywords: Effective motivation, Motivational gaps, Social exchange theory, Paired samples test.

1. Introduction

Intense competition, multiplicity of market niches and growing customer expectations especially on product/service innovation and quality place greater responsibility on employees, who are pressured to continuously deploy their knowledge/skills to deliver leading edge solutions at little or no extra cost ahead of competitors. In order to get and retain the workers required for success in the circumstance, a much greater level of effective, appropriate and multi-dimensional motivation becomes obligatory (Gould-Williams &

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Davies, 2005; Peters, 2015). A motivated employee would deliver increased efficiency, communicate better with others, work effectively in a team and show no tendency for interpersonal conflicts. Hence, Lawler III (2008) sees motivation as the performance capstone, even as an employee could have the right knowledge/expertise but perform very low if not effectively motivated. However, as every man has different values, knowledge and experiences (Mokrzycka, 2021), Shanthi & Sharma (2019) state that mastering the art of achieving effective employee motivation is a sine qua non for organizational prosperity. To this end, the literature is rife with ideas on the benefits of motivation as a tool for enhancing employee engagement, satisfaction, retention and productivity (Lawler III, 2008; Robbins, 2010). The same applies to the methods/dimensions of motivation- intrinsic and extrinsic; financial and non-financial, content and process, etc. (Shanthi & Sharma, 2019; Nadtochiy, 2021). However, knowledge is rare on the means and processes of ensuring parity between employees' motivational preferences and employers' provisioning.

Motivational provisions by employers' are often based on available budget/finance and perhaps work process/organizational structure, but without consideration for employees' specific priorities/preferences either collectively or in micro groups. As there seems to be no new sources of motivation, the need arises to carefully study employees and develop a system that focuses more on the individual features and preferred desires/demands (Nadtochiy, 2021). For instance, a worker may need more training to get motivated while another could just be happy to be told what to do.

The literature is utterly deficient in bridging the gaps in the theories of motivation (Shanthi & Sharma, 2019) as well as when it comes to achieving a balance between the range/size/levels of motivational factors desired by employees and those provided by employers (Philpott, 2016). Consequently, as many organizations offer the right, wrong, less or more of the carrot and the cane, workers often remain largely lethargic (Lawler III, 2008). Hence, to achieve results, some balancing is required, even as diversity and individual differences multiply; which demean the potency of a single motivational deal for employees especially in medium and large scale organizations (Velten & Lashley, 2018; Nolen, 2020). Effective motivation therefore, requires balancing between desires and provisions, as well as individualized deals of great value tied to job types/location, job-holders preferences or skill gaps (Lawler III, 2008; Morling & Lee, 2017; Nadtochiy, 2021). Subsequent to the motivation gap, the 2016 Edenred Wellbeing Barometer reported that a third of employees were unhappy at work (Philpott, 2016).

Meanwhile, hard to come across are studies on the communication and feedback processes that determine/balance motivational needs and offers, as well as the magnitude and consequences of the two ever being at par, in excess or shortfall of one another. In this regard, a kind of need/performance based transactional/social exchange approach to motivation has got little or no attention in research and industry. Consequently, it is tenable that most budgets and funds on employee motivation over and over again achieved limited positive results, as they would often have been spent on improvements that were of little or no preferential value to individual employees across the cadres, demography, locations, departments,

organizations, cultures and nations. In a research on employee motivation in the banking sector of Serbia (Božović et al., 1999), it was found that job security, distributive justice and a fair reward system were highly valued motivators, while salary and company climate were much less appreciated by employees. The study asked that such preferences should be routinely identified at several micro levels as a means of “increasing motivation and avoiding its relativization”.

Accordingly, this study has the objective of identifying gaps in the motivational desires of employees and the provisions made available by employers, and explaining effective motivation in terms of the size of the gaps. As such, the pivotal research question goes thus:

To what extent are motivational provisions by employers in tune with the desires/priorities of employees in work organizations, and to what extent could any differences between the two determine the effectiveness of motivation?

The following hypothesis in the Null form was formulated to focus the study.

H₀: There is no significant difference between employee motivational desires and employers motivational offers/provisions in work organizations, and any such differences do not determine the effectiveness of motivation.

The study has the a priori expectation of significant gaps between paired measures of employee motivational desires and provisions/offers made by employers; with the former expected to be largely in excess of the latter.

2. Literature review

The word “Motivation” derives from a Latin word, “movere”, which means to move, activate or energize to a higher level of positive action, behaviour and attitude towards accomplishing certain goals (Peters, 2015; Robbins, 2010). Motivation is thus an all encompassing concept of whatever aid the manager or supervisor deploys towards greater behaviour and performance. In business and management, it means work motivation whilst in education; it is students’ motivational learning (Shanthi & Sharma, 2019). It is an inter-disciplinary concept, and a large number of theoretical models have been developed in psychology, sociology, education, healthcare, economics and business; the seemingly most unfair to employees being the rational cheater model, wanting more for nothing extra. As well, strategic and tactical options in motivating employees are numerous, the most popular being the needs based approach.

Abraham Maslow identified five levels of human/employees needs as follows, starting from the most basic to the higher-order needs: physiological, safety, belonging, esteem and self-actualization (Latham, 2012; Maslow: 1943, 1954, 1962; Robbins, 2012). Some reasonable attainment of a lower order need was proposed to shift preference to the next higher order need. Physiological needs are concerned with matters of having enough wages to buy food, medication, accommodation and other needs of body and soul for self and family. Safety


needs imply job security as well as health and safety at work. Social/belonging needs include being seen as an indispensable family/team member, treasured and wanted. Esteem needs border on respect, fair supervision, job enrichment, meaningful job and career growth. Lastly, self-actualization is concerned with opportunities to rise to the top like Frederick Taylor at the Bethlehem Steel Works, to achieve all that a modest and fair minded person could ever hope to achieve, to have a sense of accomplishment on the job. Although all these motivators are extrinsic and outward driven, they are capable to reinforcing intrinsic motivation.

Likewise Clayton Alderfer identified three typologies of employee needs: namely existence, relatedness and growth; just as David McClelland categorized the need for affiliation, power and achievement. Frederick Herzberg further classified these needs into two, namely: Hygiene motivators (Job context factors) and Curative motivators (Job content factors).

Most theories - process, behavioral or content - seem incapable of addressing the balancing problem between employee motivational desires and employer offers/provisions at different levels and contexts, and the need arises therefore for new theoretical insights. To this end, researchers (Morling & Lee, 2017; Velten & Lashley, 2018; Nolen, 2020) suggest a “situative turn” and a “diversity turn” in the conversation on theories of motivation. Needed is a framework underpinned by management’s appreciation and capturing of employees’ collective and individual priorities over decisions on motivation. To this end, several related theories could be marshaled, including the goal setting theory, self-determination theory, agency theory and bargaining theories. Nevertheless, the modus operandi of all these theories can be captured within the social exchange theory (West & Turner, 2007, p. 188); which is underpinned by transactional give and take principles that ultimately create synergy, that is, four plus four equal to five effects. Recall that the issue being addressed in this study is not the classical Oliver Twist “asks for more” problem in the Animal Farm, but that of how to make provisions for motivation to reflect employees’ priorities collectively and individually, and therefore achieve greater results for all stakeholders.

All the theories articulate the provision of more of the needs without any consideration for what exactly the employees desire. Effective motivating would require linking the strategy of company’s objectives with employees’ life goals and system of values (Mokrzycka, 2021). Hence, new theories are required that stress the need for balancing between motivational desires and provisions (Shanthi & Sharma, 2019). For instance, Mokrzycka (2021) discussed the characteristic profile and the means of effective motivation of employees of the Y-Generation, the people born in the 1980s up to 1995. This group is motivated by opportunities for self-development, high salary, display of their skills and talents, meaningful work, teamwork, multi-tasking and close attention, praise, quick response, free time, entertainment, pleasure in many aspects of life, and balance between work and personal life. They hold disdain for the way the older generation was motivated only through economic man principles of work motivation, which was often connected with illness, divorce, stress and imbalance between work and private life (Mokrzycka, 2021).

Figure 1. Relationship amongst some theories on Motivational desires



Source: Stephen Robbins (2010), p.112

Figure 1 relates the contents of four popular theories of motivation- Maslow, Alderfer, Herzberg and McClelland. The self-actualization and esteem needs of Maslow are about the equivalent of Alderfer's growth need, the real motivators of Herzberg, and the achievement and power needs of McClelland. Likewise, Maslow's social belonging need matches the relatedness needs of Alderfer, the hygiene needs of Herzberg and the affiliation needs of the McClelland framework. Lastly, Maslow's physiological and safety needs are the equivalent of Alderfer's existence needs, the Herzberg hygiene factors, and McClelland's affiliation needs. Collectively, the four theoretical models are known as extrinsic motivators, as they are not sourced from employees' inner drives.

The social exchange theory would make an invaluable contribution to the effective application of existing motivation theories (Turner, 1987; Zetterberg, 1966). It is specifically applicable to the balancing problem in this study through the deployment of a wide range of exchange relationships of give and take in supervision, team-work, goal-setting, communication and evaluation. Gould-Williams & Davies (2005) empirically tested the effects of some exchange relationships between managers and employees, and reported fifty-three, forty-one, and fifty-eight percent variations in motivation, quit intentions and commitment respectively. The respondents significantly opted for greater team-working, involvement, empowerment and fair rewards as first-order relational factors of motivation.

3. The Social Exchange Theory of Motivation

The social exchange theory studies the psycho-social processes of interactive behaviour devoid of complex bargaining amongst parties involved in economic, power and dependency relationships, with a view to cooperatively reaching mutually beneficial outcomes (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Serenko & Bontis, 2016; Zafirovski, 2005). The theory postulates that interactional behaviour are guided by benefits and costs, and that mutually beneficial outcomes result when values and opinions generally are in agreement; the alternative is to reject, avoid, grudge or be contemptuous of the opposing interest (Valle et al., 2019). It therefore, connotes relationship and shared obligation within which parties have responsibilities to each other (McLeod et al., 2021; Sacks, 2006; Tinti et al., 2017).

Applied to business and work contexts, its importance manifests clearly in matters that are more relational than contractual, such as employee motivation, the mechanics of which are not often contained in employment contracts and conditions of service. As an approach to employee motivation and engagement, obligations are generated through a series of interactions between parties who are in a state of reciprocal interdependence (Saks, 2006; Tinti, Venelli-Costa, Vieira & Cappellozza, 2017). Hence, decisions on motivation can be made in a two-way relationship between the employer and employee. As the former religiously provides the economic and emotional resources, the latter repays the former by devoting greater amounts of cognitive, emotional and physical resources to perform their duties. This is the utilitarian, market equilibrium or goal optimization dimension of social exchange theory often suggested as most suitable in the work context, and extended to include non-economic and non-material motivators like power, status and supervisory relationships in general (Turner, 1987; Tinti et al., 2017).

The social exchange theory which is about the human nature and the character of human relationships is built upon several assumptions, listed as follows by West & Turner (2007: 188). Humans seek rewards and avoid punishments, humans are rational beings, the standards that humans use to evaluate costs and rewards vary across time and persons, relationships are interdependent, and relational life is a process. The assumptions capture the issues of self-interest, goal setting and utilitarian objectives - all of which effectively aim to achieve synergic outcomes greater than when the parties work independently.

However, the social exchange theory has been widely criticized based on the prisoner's dilemma in games theory that illustrates the uncooperative nature of man even when it is in their individual interest not to act selfishly (Valle et al., 2019). In any case, Zafirovski (2005) presents a positive critique of the theory. Whereas the prisoners' dilemma illustrates a situation of one-off, zero sum exit negotiation, the work organization is one of developmental and reciprocative going concern. Although the expected benefits of the social exchange theory could be limited by the difficult to realize assumptions of altruist openness, rational choice and complete information, however, an ancillary theory, the social penetration theory, offers help. It suggests that in the longer term, once the individuals start to give more of themselves to one another, relationships would keep on progressing up to the point of self-disclosure and utmost good faith. Hence, people would freely share innermost thoughts and

feelings, even as there will be nowhere to hide, soldier or play games (Saks, 2006; Valle et al., 2019). As such, an employee that has no capacity for the responsibilities of the well paid higher position would be free to express it, rather than getting promoted at the cost of a lower level of motivation. The social exchange theory seems to have been embraced by the UK National Health Service (NHS), where due to pressures of work, a number of nurses were allowed to decline tenured promotion, allowed to withdraw services and later return to service, and even encouraged to express preference for shifts, wards and number of hours to work per week. In return, nurses put in their very best, do not normally apply for leave during the summer and other festive periods, and are also frugal in resource use given the lean budgets of the treasured UK NHS. Imagine the positive motivational impact of a weekly scheduled national “thank you to our NHS Staff” during the Covid-19 crisis.

In the foregoing paragraphs, the social exchange theory has been justified as an indispensable addition to the theories of motivation. This is towards a collaborative framework to narrow the expected gaps between employees’ motivational desires and what employers often make available. The reports of field studies follow next. The existence and size of the theorized gaps were tested in the real life work environment. It was expected that the wider the gaps, the less effective would be motivation.

4. Design and Method

The research adopted the positivist tradition, the theory driven deductive design, and used a survey by questionnaire measured on a 5-point Likert Scale to collect the study data (Tinti et al, 2017). The quantitative section of the questionnaire was in three sections: Demographic information, Employees Motivational desires, and Motivational offers/provisions by employers. The qualitative section asked respondents to write statements on two questions to capture their personal experiences on motivation. The study population consisted of about three hundred employees of Dufil Prima Foods Plc. Access to the company was negotiated and granted for five working days during which questionnaire distribution and collection took place. A pilot study of fifteen respondents was carried out in order to improve the quality of the questionnaire. One hundred copies were distributed using a range of sampling methods including snowball, convenience and as available/willing. Eighty five copies of the questionnaire were returned out of which eighty one responses were found usable, the useful response rate being 81 percent.

Data were analyzed using the SPSS Version 16. Validity and reliability tests were carried out (Nadtochiy, 2021). The Alpha reliability measure of convergence of the questionnaire items was 0.77. The paired samples test of mean difference was applied as the major analytical tool. For each measure in the questionnaire, the test calculated the average (mean) of motivational desires by employees and the mean of provisions/offers by employers, and flags the measures that returned a significant difference.

5. Results and Discussion

This section presents the reports and discusses the findings of the study.

5.1 Demographic statistics.

For the sake of parsimony, the demographic characteristics of respondents are summarized as follows. On gender, 33 (40.7 percent) were male while 48 (59.3 percent) were female. Marital status: 39 (48.1 percent) were single while 42 (51.9 %) were married. Age: Below 25 years (13.6 %), 25-40 years (56.8 %), 45-50 years (23.5 %), Over 50 years (6.2 %). Highest education: Secondary (24.7%), Diploma (13.6 %), University degree/HND (33.3 %), Postgraduate degree (28.4 %). Length of service with the company: Below two year (9.9 %), 2-5 years (43.2 %), 6-10 years (37.0 %), over 10 years (9.9 %). By rank/status: 36 (44.4 %) were junior staff, while 45 (55.6 %) were senior staff. Lastly, departmental distribution: Sales (12.3%), R&D (12.3%), Accounts (6.2%), Packaging (8.6%), Maintenance (12.3%), Marketing (13.6%), Production (13.6%), Security (6.2%) and HRM (14.8%)

The preceding figures show a fair/balanced demographic distribution. Majority of the respondents were mature in age, well educated, spread widely across the departments, and with a fairly lengthy period of service in the company. As such, they were expected to understand the questions asked and provide intelligent/accurate answers; which means that the responses would fairly reflect the state of affairs.

5.2 Descriptive statistics

On a 1-5 Likert Scale, the mean score on employees' motivational desires ranged between 1.84 and 3.81 while the standard deviation varied between 0.884 and 1.256. The grand mean with the grand standard deviation in bracket was 3.006 (1.060). In contrast, for employer's motivational offers/provisions, the mean scores were expectedly lower and ranged between 1.33 and 3.31. The standard deviation also varied from 0.641 to 1.347. The grand mean with the overall standard deviation in bracket was 2.305 (0.940). These results show that employee motivational desires were higher at between 1.84 and 3.81 compared to between 1.33 and 3.31 for employer provisions.

The results show that the employer does motivate the employees but the employees' expectations/desires for work place motivation were far higher than the provisions/offers made available. If this finding were across board for all measures of motivation, it would have normally been a reflection of the "unlimited wants" and "limited resources" dichotomy that underpin economic theory. However, it is important to test the significance of the differences observed.

5.3 Test of Hypothesis

The singular objective of the study was to identifying gaps in the motivational desires of employees and what employers make available, and to explain effective motivation in terms of the size of the gaps. To this end, the Null hypothesis of the study goes thus: There is no significant difference between employee motivational desires and employers motivational offers/provisions in work organizations, and any such differences do not determine the effectiveness of motivation.

Table 1. Paired samples test: Fitting of motivational gaps to theoretical models

S/N 1	Measures of Motivation 2	Paired samples test of means			Theoretical models		Desired (D) Vs Provided (P) 8
		Desired 3	Provided 4	Sig. (p) 5	Maslow 6	Herzberg 7	
1	Recognition	2.09	3.26	.001	Esteem	Content	Excess
2	Salary advances	1.33	1.89	.001	Physiological	Context	Excess
3	Social interactions	3.06	3.15	.658	Belonging	Context	Balance*
4	Involvement	3.31	3.17	.400	Belonging	Context	Balance*
5	Friendliness	2.99	3.58	.003	Belonging	Context	Excess
6	Cooperation	2.64	3.60	.001	Belonging	Context	Excess
7	Salary reviews	1.75	2.44	.001	Physiological	Context	Excess
8	Medical support	1.85	1.84	.939	Security	Context	Balance*
9	Supervision	2.86	2.69	.281	Esteem	Context	Balance*
10	Paid holidays	1.59	2.72	.001	Belonging	Context	Excess
11	Advancement	3.15	2.48	.001	Actualization	Content	Shortfall
12	Promotion	4.30	3.79	.002	Actualization	Content	Shortfall
13	Training	3.62	2.23	.001	Esteem	Content	Shortfall
14	Tools/Equipment	3.36	4.35	.001	Esteem	Content	Excess
15	Work/family life	3.94	3.59	.024	Actualization	Context	Shortfall
16	Work environment	3.99	2.69	.001	Esteem	Context	Shortfall
17	Job security	4.15	3.85	.048	Security	Context	Shortfall
18	Restrooms	2.81	2.04	.001	Security	Context	Shortfall
19	Bonuses	4.70	3.91	.001	Esteem	Context	Shortfall
20	Autonomy	3.35	2.85	.003	Esteem	Content	Shortfall

1. * Paired means difference not statistically significant at $p < 0.05$

2. General picture: Balance (4 measures); Excess (7 measures); Shortfall (9 measures).

Table 1 summarizes the results of the paired samples test and fits the instrumental measures of motivation in the study to two popular theoretical models developed by Abraham Maslow and Frederick Herzberg. This is with a view to identifying motivational measures that were either over or under provided by the employer, and to reveal the specific dimensions of the Maslow and Herzberg theoretical models that are either exact, deficient or surplus to requirements.

Columns 3 and 4 report the mean scores on each measure of motivation listed in column 2, with the significant level of the differences reported in column 5. Columns 6 and 7 distributed the measures into the 5-level Maslow model and the two-factor Herzberg framework respectively. By so doing, the study identified the extent of balancing, surplus or shortfall between employees' motivational desires and employers' provisions.

Out of the twenty factors listed in Column 2, only four (in bold print), namely social interactions, involvement, medicals support and supervision returned insignificant differences in the mean scores of employee desires and employers provisions on motivation. In effect, a balance was achieved. For seven (7) of the remaining sixteen measures of motivation, employer's provisions were significantly in excess of employee' desires; which means an over-provision, the kind of motivation that have little or no value to employees, even as funds spent on those seven measures would be like down the drain. For the remaining nine of the twenty measures, employers' provisions were strongly deficient of employees' desires. In effect, disharmony between desires and offers were pervasive in the company studied. The foregoing results could be likened to pointing a torchlight in the wrong direction, or turning and running in the opposite direction in a relay race. This finding runs afoul of the economic postulation that human desires are always higher than the resources/means of satisfying them. The results in Table 1 also query the general perception of employees as rational cheaters and Oliver Twist.

The foregoing discussion reports a balance (no significant gap) between only four out of twenty measures of motivation studied. In effect, empirical gaps were pervasive and all encompassing. As such, there is no basis to accept the hypothesis of no significant difference between employee motivational desires and employers' motivational offers/provisions in the organization studied.

It is important to explore the specific dimensions of some motivation theories where employees' desires and employers' provisions were either at par, in shortfall or surplus of one another. Column 7 classified the measures of motivation into six (6) content factors and fourteen (14) context factors of the well-known two-factor theory by Frederick Herzberg. Column 8 reveals that none out of the six content factors and only four out of the fourteen context factors returned mean scores of desires and provisions that were not significantly different. Nine were under-provided while seven others were over-supplied. Given the wide knowledge of the content factors (items 1, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 20 in column 2) as the actual motivators, the finding that none of the mean scores were at par is a travesty, a conundrum en-route effective motivation. Out of the fourteen context-factor measures, only four had at par mean scores. As such, effective worker motivation would be hard to achieve.

As well, in Column 6 of Table 1, the twenty measures were fitted into the five-level Maslow hierarchy of human needs, and explored for dimensions whose mean difference between employee desires and employers' provisions were either at par, deficient or surplus to one another. The analysis shows that for all three measures falling within self-actualization as the highest and most cherished dimension of the Maslow framework, employee desires fell significantly short of provisions made by the employer. In contrast, two measures fell within the physiological needs level, both of which were over-provisioned. In effect, none of the measures falling under both of the lowest level physiological needs and the highest level self-actualization needs of employees returned significantly at par mean scores between desires and provisions. The employees were over-provided with regular salary reviews as well as robust opportunities for salary advance, both perhaps in an effort to ensure that workers do not fall short of their routine financial needs to keep body and soul together. The alternative would have been a situation when an employee on the assembly line would perhaps carry an empty stomach and possibly collapse. In contrast and as if by design, all three measures that fall within self-actualization desires- advancement, promotion and work/family life balance were all under-provisioned relative to what employees expected.

Likewise, for the esteem needs that lie immediately below the self-actualization needs, at par mean score between desires and provisions was achieved only in one (Supervision) out of seven measures. Four measures were under-provisioned while two others were over-supplied. In the circumstance, motivation would be ineffective. The results show a departure in the case of the belonging need, as two out of the five measures studied returned at par mean scores between desires and provisions, while the remaining three were over provided. This result suggests that the company will be effective in creating a feeling that employees were loved, valued and cherished as members of the same family. As for the second level of the Maslow framework of needs- security, three measures were studied. Medicals support had an at par mean difference between desires and provisions, while for the remaining two- job security and restrooms, employees desires fell short of employer provisions.

The foregoing discussion is to the effect that motivation in the company studied would be far from effective, as significant gaps between employees' motivational expectations/desires and employers' provisions were widespread. The best effort was on the belonging need of the Maslow model where the company could be said to have got it right on two out of five measures- a score of 40 percent.

Next, we present visual plots of the foregoing results in order to aid understanding. Figure 2 shows that the two lines-blue and green are almost exclusively clear of one another. At par mean





Figure 3. Motivation Gaps Grid

Figure 2. Mean difference plot of desires and provisions




Figure 4. Scatter diagram of Desires and Offers




Fig. 5. Line graph of Desires/Offers (Maslow Model)




Fig. .6 Line graph of Desires/ Offers (Herzberg's Model)

differences would mean that the two lines are closer and almost lying on the same space. For each measure of motivation, the longer the distance between the two lines, the less effective motivation would be, no matter which line lies ahead of the other.

Figure 3 presents a grid in four quadrants labeled 1-4. Quadrant 1 is populated by measures whose mean scores of the desires and provisions were low, while in contrast, Quadrant 3 is inhabited by those with higher mean scores of the motivational desires and provisions. The elements contained in these two quadrants are those that returned insignificant mean differences and gaps. As such, they are the actual motivators, as the thesis of this study is: The lower the gaps between each pair of desire and offer, the higher would be effective motivation.

As well, Figure 4 reports a scatter diagram of the motivation scales, fitted to the Maslow model, with a meandering arrow shooting out from the origin. Each pair of same-colour dots that are relatively close to the arrow represents an effective motivator. The belonging and esteem needs stand out in Figure 4 as effective motivators. Figure 5 confirms the report in Figure 4, with the belonging need and the esteem need having the narrowest gaps in between the two line graphs. Lastly, Figure 6 reports the line graphs of desires and provisions fitted into the Herzbergs's two-factor theoretical model. Clearly, the gap between desires and provisions are far apart for the content factors (cure/actual motivators), but much closer for the context (hygiene) factors. This means that the content factors; which have been demonstrated in theory and practice to be the actual motivators are of little or no effective usage in the study company. In contrast, the very little gap on the right hand side of Figure 6 indicates that the context factors of motivation were more correctly applied. However, the context factors are widely known as the hygiene rather than curative factors of motivation. They do not go far in the direction of effective motivation. To make motivational efforts more effective, the need therefore arises to gauge the preferences and values of employees on the content factors of motivation and offer bite size provisions.

To what extent do these gaps between employee motivational desires and employers offers actually affect performance? This question is the purpose of the hypothesis; which states that

differences between employees' motivational desires and provisions made by employers do not significantly impact on employee/organizational performance. This hypothesis was tested using direct quotations from the transcript of the responses to some open/qualitative questions in the survey questionnaire.

The question was asked: Please can you briefly describe one remarkable incident at work when you were really motivated to do much more than you would otherwise have done?

What they wrote

1. "when I was recognized in a conference and given an award that I valued, the first time ever in my live"
2. "During a seminar I was asked to give my view on the type of motivation that would make an employee tick...."
3. " the customers came in complaining and my employer asked if I could solve the problem. I was issued with a recognition that day, I did more than I would have done and I solved the problem"
4. "I was sent abroad for training/skill acquisition on my job. What a major difference it has made to my live?"
5. "I was paid for the extra hours I used throughout the month. Although I worked long hours, I did not have to take salary advance which is hard to pay back"
6. "there was an increment in my salary which I craved for; it motivated me to do much more than I ever did "
7. " I was given a scholarship for further studies abroad. It was as if my managers knew what I cherished most....."
8. " I was given an official car by the company, a car that I would never have been able to afford on my own; and this motivated me to do much more"
9. " when the general manager praised me for a job well done during a conference, I felt the greatest joy, far higher than on the several other encouragements they often brandish about"

The foregoing responses are to the effect that motivation is effective in terms of greater performance only when it uses tools and methods that are of the greatest values to employees. This finding comes remarkably clear from respondent number 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 above. The respondents were also asked to phrase out how exactly they would like to be motivated for greater performance, commitment and loyalty. Listed in the order 1-10, below, the following were lifted out exactly from what they wrote.

1. "award and recognition"; 2. "recognition of my effort"; 3. "recognition";
4. "training and skill acquisition"; 5. "increment in my normal salary"; 6. "salary increase"; 7. "scholarship"; 8. "award"; 9. "recognition"; 10. "career advances".

The second set of direct quotations above show that seven out of the ten employees clearly expressed preference for recognition, one for training and the remaining two opted for salary increases. Awards and recognition fall within the content factors of motivation on which the study company did not fare well as per earlier results in this study. This finding is to the effect that only when employees are motivated with the tools and methods they value very well would they go the extra miles to offer their best. On the basis of this evidence, it is tenable to reject the hypothesis that differences or a mismatch between employees' desires and provisions by employees do not impact on performance, as the urge/zeal to carry out daily activities would not be there. When choices/decisions on motivation are driven exceedingly by the employer, without any recourse to employees' values and preferences in the process, motivational efforts and funds expended towards greater performance and excellence would be of no effect or consequence.

The reviewed works of Philpott, 2016; Velten & Lashley, 2018; Nolen, 2020; and Nadtochiy, 2021 all lend credence to the findings of the study that imbalance between employees' desires and employer provisioning is pervasive in companies. This perhaps was why Shanti & Sharma (2019) and Mokrycka (2021) called for theories and strategies that link an organization's motivational objectives with the employees' live goals/values. The results of the study also agree with the findings of Bozovic et al (1999), who reported an empirical classification of motivators into two: those highly and others lowly valued by employees in an Asian organization.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The study examined the gaps between motivational desires of employees and employers as the determinant of effective motivation and employee performance. It did some theoretical review that exposes the limitation of existing theories of motivation based on "ever providing more and more motivation" rather than "balancing employees' desires/preferences with employers' provisioning". The review also highlighted the dimensions of some theoretical models often associated with more effective performance. The study found the content factors of the Herzberg model as well as the esteem/self actualization levels of the Maslow framework as more effective on employee and organizational performance. These are the dimensions either over or under-provisioned by the company, and the measured mismatch was the greatest. In effect, motivation would be ineffective, with negative consequences for employee/organizational performance.

The study recommends as follows:

1. Employees would be motivated towards greater performance if provisions by companies reflect the desired preferences of employees. To do otherwise is wasteful as motivational expenses on things that are of little value to employees would not achieve the expected results.
2. Employers need to drop the scientific management notion of employees as the "economic man" always asking for more, as well as the industrial psychology notion of employees

as “rational cheaters”. These two notions become invalid in the light of context factors of motivation; which was considered as “over provided and surplus to requirements” in Table 2 as well as Figures 2 and 5.

3. Given the finding of pervasive gaps in motivation, the need arises to deploy the methods of the social exchange theory reviewed earlier. It is underpinned by the psycho-social processes of interactive behaviour amongst parties in economic and dependency relationships, with a view to cooperatively reach mutually beneficial responsibilities and outcomes on matters of employee motivation (Serenko & Bontis, 2016; Valle et al, 2019; McLeod et al, 2021).
4. Arising from No. 3 above, researchers and practitioners need to extend the “opposing interest” rather than the Oliver Twist approaches in the discussion of motivation, and embrace processes that harp on shared obligations and responsibilities within the parties. When the opposing interests are nearer to one another, the gaps identified in this study will diminish; hence, motivation would be effective and exercise positive change in employee performance.

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COVID-19 DISCORDANT TUNES AND WHO'S DILEMMA AS THE PIPER'S BENEFACTOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA

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Abstract

The implosion of international organisations poses serious threat to the existence of such organisations and the welfare of member states. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) is faced with a possible implosion as it has received and continue to receive serious criticisms in the manner it is handling the global health challenge. This has culminated into threat of, and actual withholding of funds from its largest financier, the United States, including threats of membership withdrawal from the US and other member-states. The paper adopts the exploratory research design and document analysis, using secondary data sources to analyse the challenges and consequences of a possible implosion and/or depletion of the WHO during and post-COVID-19, especially for African countries. It concludes that the implosion of the WHO is dangerous, and most dangerous for the African continent, and especially in the middle of a pandemic. As such, member-states must cooperate at this time to continue to support the WHO's responses to the pandemic.

Keywords: COVID-19, World Health Organisation, United States, Coronavirus, pandemic, Africa

Introduction

As the world battles the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, unsurprisingly, several issues and events have unfolded. These range from inter-governmental relations to state relations and international relations. Particularly, international relations seem to be taking an entirely different shape for the first time since the end of the Cold War, amidst the pandemic. International borders were shut, trade relations are altered and heated political arguments and power play surrounding the origin of the COVID-19 ongoing between the United States and China. Even as the world begins to ease the global lockdown occasioned by the pandemic, some countries are 'carefully' selecting the countries they choose to open their borders to. No doubt that things and human and national behaviours have changed indeed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper looks at the politics of finance targeted against the World Health Organisation (WHO) as well as the implications on third world countries, with a view to prepare against future circumstances that may threaten the existence and functionality of international organisations

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The WHO has received and continues to receive backlash from some member and non-member states on the manner in which it had handled the pandemic in the onset. This is generating suspicion, frustration, anger and complete loss of confidence in the WHO. While the COVID-19 had first broke out in Wuhan City of China in December, 2019, the WHO had come to the open, perhaps with insufficient scientific evidence to support China's claim that the virus cannot spread from human-to-human (Beaumont & Bosley, 2020). This confirmation by the WHO had given the world no reason to be afraid and put necessary measures in place early enough to contain the virus' spread. The virus had since spread to 224 countries and territories across the world, infected over 436.332 million people, with over 5.9 million deaths (Worldometer, 2022). It was not until March 11, 2020, that the WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. This and other actions of the WHO with respect to the management of COVID-19 had not gone down well with some countries, with the United States (US) particularly leading the revolt and dissatisfaction against the WHO.

The US believes that the WHO and China have some explanations to give with respect to the origin of COVID-19. The US also feels that the WHO is aiding and abetting China at this critical time, as such, it feels the organisation does no longer deserve its support and membership (Ehley & Ollstein, 2020). Also, Madagascar, an African country, had its fair share of the disappointment with the WHO amidst the pandemic. While the country had come up with an herbal drink it believes effectively cures COVID-19, the country's president accused the WHO for not acknowledging the herbal drink as a global vaccine for the pandemic (BBC News, 2020a). The country believes this is happening because the COVID-19 'cure' is coming out of Africa, and the Madagascan president allegedly accused the WHO of bribing him to poison the COVID-19 herbal drink (Tanzania Perspective May 14, 2020). In the face of this, the country has also threatened withdrawal of its membership from the WHO. The likes of Burundi, Canada and Taiwan (a non-state member) have also opened up on their dissatisfaction with WHO's management of the pandemic.

While several interventions have been made on the economic, social and political effect of COVID-19 on nations and international governments, and its effects on international relations and geopolitical power, such attention is yet to be given to the crisis of confidence currently tearing the WHO apart. What is gleaned from existing literature is that implosion of International Organisations (IOs) by way of member-state threat or actual withholding funding and withdrawal of membership, has adverse effect on the IOs and member-states (see for instance Annan, 1993; Bocco, 2010; von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2018; Brolmann, et al. 2018; Eckhard, et al. 2016; Engel, 2015; Wright, 1957). Albeit, this is yet to be interrogated specifically as it concerns the threats from member-states on withholding funding and withdrawal of membership from the WHO in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the implication of such depletion of the WHO on member-states, especially low income member-states in Africa. This is the gap this paper seeks to fill for at least two reasons. First, states' threats of withholding funding and withdrawal of membership from the WHO is coming right in the middle of a global pandemic; secondly, the US, a major large contributor with the highest contribution to the WHO's annual budget is leading this threat against the health organisation.

What exactly is the problem with the WHO amidst the COVID-19 crisis? What is the finance politics around the WHO, now and post-COVID-19, and the implications for Africa? What is the possible way out of these impending challenges? These are the crucial questions the paper seeks to provide tenable answers.

Theoretical Framework

The Realist school of thought on international relations sees states as always making efforts to avert the restraining influence that international laws and international organisations may impact on their foreign policies (Morgenthau, 1985). Rather, they strive to ride on the heels of IOs to promote and achieve their national interests and they do this for ‘relative gains’, rather than for supposed cooperation (Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994). For Gruber (2000), IOs must not be seen as providing joint gains for members, rather, the most powerful member-states take advantage of the union and sometimes make others worse off than they were before joining the IO. For the Realists, IOs are designed to be dominated, and often times, follow the dictates of the most powerful states or be irrelevant to international affairs (Mearsheimer, 1994). Hence, the assertion by Martin and Simmons (2001: 330) that ‘powerful states simply buy off the cooperation of smaller ones in international organisations.’

Reynaud and Vauday (2009); and Stone (2004) have also shown how IOs (involved in lending and financial issues), often reflect the geopolitical interest of major powers, especially the United States. The Realists thus, see IOs as the puppet for powerful states with which they further pursue their national interests and foreign policies, while posing to be assisting the less powerful states. For instance, the interest of the US to see to the democratisation of Africa and other Third World states, and the spread of its economic philosophy of capitalism, saw to the establishment of the World Bank, the enrolment of African and developing states into IOs, and the conditionality of official development aids (ODA) to achieve such US interest as democratisation and capitalism (Idowu, 2020).

The Realists’ thought on IOs and membership influence and power play explains why, according to Kaja and Werkman (2010), developing and African countries on the board of financial institutions like the World Bank, can amass additional loans of up to 60 million US dollars for themselves. The same reason why, as Kuziemko and Werker (2006) aver, powerful countries on the UN security council can receive up to 59 per cent additional bilateral aid from the United States. This sum up of the Realists’ view on IOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) is mostly in favour of powerful states. Looked differently, Martin and Simmons (2001) show that new Realists have explored how powerful states use IOs to achieve their security objectives. He (2008) posits that this is achieved when powerful states deploy pressure and threat on IOs to secure their security interests. Increasingly, powerful states have also used IOs to achieve debt relief and amass huge funds for anti-terrorism activities (Gstohl, 2007).

While IOs may not have been created to ostensibly pursue the interest of powerful states, the fact remains, according to Realists, that they (IOs) end up being hijacked by the powerful

states to pursue their national interest and foreign policy often to the detriment of African and developing states. This best explains therefore, why when such state interests are at risk or seem to be, powerful states are quick to withdraw their support and contributions to IOs, or at least threaten to do so. To the extreme, some powerful states threaten to withdraw their membership or go ahead to withdraw membership of IOs. This is quite straight forward; if the IOs do no longer protect the best of their interest, then it does not make sense to continue to support their activities or be a member. The Realist thought on IOs quite captures the explanation as to the rationale behind states' withholding of contributions and withdrawal of membership of IOs or threats to do so. Where states lose confidence in the IO (Brolmann et al. 2018) to protect their interest, then are they likely to withdraw support, contributions and membership. This is correct to the extent that if it is not about states' individual interests, then member-states of IOs will retain support and contributions to IOs and membership of the organisation, come what may.

Arm Twisting Challenges of International Organisations

International Organisations and Finance Politics

No doubt that international organisations (IOs) and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the WHO, exist for global cooperation and coexistence, at least on the surface. This is correct to the extent that due to the inability of individual States to raise resources and technology to achieve certain goals, IOs and IGOs provide platforms which enable states to pull resources together to address common challenges and achieve a common goal across the globe or regions. Notwithstanding the very tangential role of IOs, member-states may decide to withhold support or funding for reasons often best known to them. The point must be made however, that withholding support and funding from IOs could have from minor to very dire consequences (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2018; Brolmann, et al. 2018), depending on the strength of the withholding state and the level of institutionalisation of the IOs and IGOs.

Funding rules are important in IOs, to determine members' commitment to the IO. Graham (2016: 5) posits that funding rules

Establish whether states are legally obligated to provide financial support to an IO, and allocate burden sharing across members. They specify whether donors can dictate the terms of their support by attaching conditions to financial contributions or, conversely, whether they must rely on the decisions of governing bodies to distribute funds.

Funding rules of IOs thus, have a way to influence the authority of IOs and the level of influence donor member-states has over the organisation. Mandatory and voluntary (unrestricted and restricted) funding rules are identified by Graham (2016). While mandatory funding rules are those compulsory membership annual dues by member-states, voluntary implies those extra contributions from member-states and other relevant actors on their own volition.

Mandatory funding provides a reliable source of resources for IOs. The IOs apportion dues to member-states under the mandatory funding rule. Graham avers that under the mandatory funding rule, the control and influence of member-states are limited and is often met with obstacles while attempting to turn contributions into influence or control. Where a member's interest clashes with compliance with the mandatory funding rule, such a member-state has to choose between compliance that contradicts its self-interest, or a 'breach of legal obligation' (Graham, 2016: 5). When States violate their contribution commitments or withhold it, Guzman (2002) infer that such action could cost states their voting rights or suffer reputation damages and cause financial damage on the institution. While states may withhold their contribution to IOs to register their grievances, they only do so with mandatory dues when other means of resolving their grievances fail. This is often due to the cost that comes with withholding or violating mandatory dues (Graham, 2016: 6).

Voluntary funding rule of IOs is more flexible and grants greater control to donors and member-states than the mandatory funding (Graham, 2015). This funding is not compulsory and allows donors and member-states to determine when and how much they contribute to the IOs budget. Defaulting in voluntary funding by donors or member-states does not attract any form of sanctions from IOs. Graham (2015) identified two forms of voluntary funding-unrestricted and restricted voluntary funding. While donors and member-states do not have control over what their contributions can be used for under the unrestricted form, they have influence and control over what their voluntary contributions are to be deployed on under the restricted voluntary funding.

The relationship between IOs and member-states, amidst financial commitments and contributions from member-states has also attracted interest. To what extent does IOs maintain autonomy from member-states, especially from their major financiers? Bauer and Ege (2014) and Ege (2016) have explored the links between resourcing from member-states contributions and the relations of power and influence over IOs. Over reliance on member-state financial contributions obviously has a way to erode IOs autonomy, hence, Seitz and Martens (2017) called for the diversification of resources and funding sources to foundations and corporations, rather than rely heavily on member-states. Major financial crises and shortfall in international assistance await IOs and poor States respectively, when major financier member-states withhold funding. The possibility of control over IOs from major financier member-states can also not be disputed. Nevertheless, Goetz and Patz (2017: 8) contend that the 'implications of resource diversification for the relative power and influence of IOs vis-à-vis their financiers are far from clear-cut.' This implies that resource diversification for IOs does not often guarantee their autonomy and freedom from undue influences from some member-states. Sources of resource diversification for IOs include voluntary and earmarked funding (Graham, 2017) and special purpose trust fund (Thorvaldsdottir, 2016).

There is no gainsaying the fact that the availability of adequate financial and material resources to IOs and IGOs determine how much they are successful achieving their global goals (Wright, 1975). This is of course, due to the huge amount of resources often required

to address global challenges when they arise. Despite this obvious need for adequate resources by IOs, the recurring challenge over time has often been that of inadequate funding to execute their mandates effectively (Annan, 1993). While some of the IOs are grossly underfunded (Bocco, 2010; Engel, 2015), others have simply had funding 'crises' over time (Goetz & Patz, 2017: 5). According to scholars like Claude (1964); Taylor (1991); Hufner (2017); and Eckhard, et al. (2016), the financial crises which befall IOs are often a result of abrupt and unexpected withholding or outright withdrawal of contributions by some member-states. This financial crisis is worse when the member-state withholding contribution has been a major financier of the IO. This was exactly the case when the US under the presidency of Donald Trump, made a massive budget cut to the United Nations system in 2017 (Goetz & Patz, 2017). This had created some financial crisis for the UN, the United States having been one of its major financiers.

While the withholding or withdrawal of contributions by member-states constitute financial crises for IOs, the outright withdrawal of states' membership of IOs means that such IOs will lose contributions from those exiting states, thereby weaken the IO's capacity to function effectively. This is yet another source of financial crises for IOs, especially when the withdrawal is from a major financier. For instance, Indonesia's declaration of withdrawal from the UN in 1965 (Brolmann, et al. 2018: 248); notice of withdrawal to the WHO by USSR in 1949 (Siddiqi, 1995: 104); notice of withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to UNESCO in 1954 (van Rij, 2018: 28); and the US and Israel's notifications of withdrawal to UNESCO in 2017 (UNESCO, 2017), no doubt, constituted some financial lapses for the IOs. The financial implications of Brexit on the European Union are still being monitored and the EU will definitely miss out on the contributions from Britain. McDermott (2000) has also identified resource 'mismatch' as a major source of financial crises to IOs. This occurs as a result of unforeseen and unplanned demands of the budgets of IOs. This often takes the form of refugee crises or man-made and natural disaster and crises (Goetz & Patz, 2017). Given these realities, Goetz and Patz (2017: 5) have called for the diversification and reform of IOs 'financing and resource politics.' There is no gainsaying the fact that the brunt of the financial crises which IOs suffer is often mostly borne by developing states who are more in need of the assistance of IOs.

Methodology

The paper adopts an exploratory research design and document analysis, using secondary data source. It relies on relevant literature like textbooks, journal and magazine articles, Newspaper reports, official, government and WHO documents and gazettes, and the Internet. Data are analysed using the discourse analysis.

WHO in the Face of COVID-19

Confronted with the COVID-19 pandemic, the WHO has continued to battle issues of members' confidence and its credibility and capability are once again being put to test. The question of the true mandate of the WHO (Clift, 2013) in the face of such a pandemic as the

COVID-19, has also come to the fore. In the face of a pandemic such as the COVID-19, the WHO is expected to perform at least four roles according to its International Health Regulations (IHR). These include: collect information on the disease from non-governmental sources and share with other States; declare a public health emergency of international concern; ask States to deploy travel and trade safety measures with scientific and public health data to defend their actions if such measures do not conform with the WHO's guidelines; and monitor States' responses to the disease to ensure that human rights are not being violated (Cooper, 2020).

Within the ambits of these mandates, the US is of the opinion that, the WHO has not handled the pandemic professionally, and has aided the unpreparedness for the virus on a global scale. While the virus broke out in Wuhan City of China in December 2019, the US alleged that the WHO had supported China to give credence to the claims that the virus cannot and does not spread from human-to-human (Beaumont & Bosley, 2020). This, the US believes, had made the world rather relaxed and did not prepare well enough for the pandemic, thus taking the world unawares. The WHO had to wait three months after the first case in Wuhan before it declared the virus a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. This had not gone down well with the US who feels the WHO was taking sides with China to conceal the true status and origin of the Coronavirus (Ehley & Ollstein, 2020). This threw up issues of lack of confidence in the credibility and capability of the WHO to manage the COVID-19.

In his letter to the WHO on May 18, the US President Donald Trump insisted that the ineffective, inefficient and politicisation of the handling of COVID-19 by the WHO has resulted in the spike of COVID-19 cases across the world (Trump, 2020). In his accusations, the US President averred:

The World Health Organization consistently ignored credible reports of the virus spreading in Wuhan in early December 2019 or even earlier...The World Health Organization failed to independently investigate credible reports that conflicted directly with the Chinese government's official account...By no later than December 30, 2019, the World Health Organization office in Beijing knew that there was a "major public health" concern in Wuhan...Taiwanese authorities had communicated information to the World Health Organization indicating human-to-human transmission of a new virus. Yet the World Health Organization chose not to share any of this critical information with the rest of the world, probably for political reasons (Trump, 2020: 1).

In what seemed misleading and unprofessional, on January 14, 2020, the WHO tweeted on its official Twitter account @WHO that, 'Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus' (WHO, 2020a; 2020b). However, on January 30, 2020, the WHO, without disclaiming or putting down its previous claims, declared the Coronavirus a 'public health emergency of international concern' (Beaumont & Borger, 2020). This latter declaration, the

US claims, was a result of ‘overwhelming evidence to the contrary’, which had forced the WHO to renege on its previous claims of the virus only within one week (Trump, 2020: 2).

The United States’ suspicion of conspiracy was reinforced by the WHO’s condemnation of the former’s travel restriction on travellers to or from China, given that the latter extolled China for placing a ban on domestic flights, but was unhappy with the US for placing same travel ban to and from China. The US saw this approach as deadly, as Trump averred that ‘Your [WHO] political gamesmanship on this issue was deadly, as other governments, relying on your comment, delayed imposing life-saving restrictions on travel to and from China’ (Trump, 2020: 2).

The seemingly downplay by the WHO, of the deadly and infectious nature of COVID-19 at the onset is yet another problem that the organisation incurred especially with the US. The WHO stated on March 3, 2020, that ‘COVID-19 does not transmit effectively as influenza...only one percent of reported cases do not have symptoms, and most of these cases develop symptoms within two days’ (Trump, 2020: 3; WHO, 2020c). The virus so simply described has however, spread across 224 countries of the world and infected over 436.3 million people (Worldometer, 2022). The virus had infected over 100,000 people across 114 countries, killing over 4,000 as of March 11, 2020, before the WHO could declare it a global pandemic (Trump, 2020). Having to wait that long does not seem to suggest efficiency and proactiveness on the part of the WHO. The US believes that the WHO could have done ‘so much better’ in handling the COVID-19 pandemic, as its mishandling of the health crisis has cost the world so much.

Given these accusations and perceived mishandling of the pandemic therefore, the US had temporarily frozen its funding to the WHO. It declared its intentions to seize its funding to the WHO and threatened withdrawal of membership. According to the US President Trump, ‘if the World Health Organization does not commit to major substantive improvements within the next 30 days, I will make my temporary freeze of the United States funding to the World Health Organization permanent and reconsider our membership of the organisation that...it is so clearly not serving America’s interests’ (Trump, 2020: 4). Just 11 days after the 30 days ultimatum, Trump declared that the WHO has not made any reform, as such, the US would withdraw from the organisation (Ehley & Ollstein, 2020).

The foregoing clearly demonstrates Realists’ perception of States’ membership of IOs for national interest and further pursuant of foreign policy, rather than for presumed cooperation (see for instance, Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994). The US has thus, made its point clear that it cannot continue to support an IO which does not serve its best of interest. As far as the country is concerned, it has lost confidence (Brolmann, et al. 2018) in the WHO to protect or serve its interest, as such, the withholding of funding and withdrawal of membership is a possibility as the Realist school has buttressed. The fact that the US is also speaking up and showing the shortcomings of the WHO in managing the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the influential role of powerful states in IOs (see for instance, Martin & Simmons, 2001). Indeed, as Cooper (2020) posits, ‘WHO’s response to the Coronavirus pandemic has raised new questions about its funding and structure as well as perceptions that politics caused the

organization to drag its feet while setting COVID-19 guidelines in an effort not to upset China.’

Canada has also shown its disappointment over the WHO’s attempt to downplay the infectiousness and risk of the global spread of COVID-19. For instance, Conservative MP, Matt Jeneroux contended that ‘There is absolutely no doubt the WHO has been slow to recommend concrete measures, and that has negatively affected Canada’s response to the virus. In fact, the WHO has gone above and beyond to thank China for its response, which has been to mislead the world on the gravity of the virus’ (Cooper, 2020). The Taiwanese authorities, although not a member of the WHO, have also accused the organisation of mishandling the health crisis. The country claimed to have informed the WHO of strange health symptoms emanating from China as early as December 31, 2019, which the WHO ignored (Trump, 2020; Watt, 2020).

The point must be made however, that even though the WHO has the responsibility to conduct assessments in States and ask for information, it must do this bearing in mind the sovereignty of such States. Hence, the WHO must work with states at their permission and request for assistance. Therefore, WHO cannot and could not have forced China to conduct an assessment of the Coronavirus until the country made the request of the organisation and was willing to share information (Kamradt-Scott, 2020).

Established in 1948, it is pertinent to note that membership of the WHO is acquired by states through their membership of the United Nations (UN), while non-member states of the UN could apply to the membership which needs the approval of a simple majority vote of the World Health Assembly (WHO, 2022a). The WHO is presently made up of 194 member states. In the light of the above, member-states are therefore, free to withdraw their membership at any time. Nevertheless, the US’ threat to withdraw its membership of the WHO has also been seen as an ‘empty threat’ (Koh, 2020). This is to the extent that although the WHO does not make provisions for member-state’s withdrawal, the process is however not straightforward for a State like the US whose Congress has imposed at least two clauses to its withdrawal from the WHO. The US Congress passed a Joint Resolution in 1948, highlighting the two conditions the country must satisfy before it can successfully withdraw its membership from the WHO. The first is that it must give a one-year official notice of withdrawal to the WHO; secondly, it must fulfil its financial obligations to the WHO for the financial year (Koh, 2020). What this implies is that if the US makes true its threat to leave the WHO, it cannot do so spontaneously, until at least, at the expiration of one year notice. Also, the country must clear its outstanding 60 million US dollars which it owed the WHO for the fiscal year 2020. Whatever the case in the long run, the US Congress has to approve the president’s call for withdrawal. President Trump’s criticism of the WHO has been criticised in some quarters as a tactic by the president to divert attention away from his gross mismanagement of the pandemic (Huang, 2020; Watt, 2020). The attempt to pull out of an IO to which the US has committed membership and funding, in the middle of a global pandemic has also been questioned (Kamradt-Scott, 2020).

In Africa, the WHO has also been accused of mishandling the COVID-19 pandemic. Madagascar demonstrated its grievances towards the WHO and threatened to leave the organisation amidst the pandemic. For the country, the WHO is being partial for not recognising its COVID-19 herbal drink which it believes has the potential to cure the virus (BBC News, 2020a). The country has accused the WHO of not recognising the herbal drink simply because it is coming out of Africa. The Madagascan president had also allegedly claimed that the WHO had offered him bribe to get the country's COVID-19 herbal drink poisoned (Tanzania Perspective May 14, 2020). Albeit, this report of bribery by the Tanzania Perspective has been debunked by Africa Check (2020), claiming the president never made such claims in the purported interview. Notwithstanding, the Madagascan authorities have not debunked this statement associated with them.

Also, Tanzania experienced an attempt by the WHO country team to falsify and increase COVID-19 cases in the country by reporting false results. The country's president, John Magufuli had put the WHO to test by sending in samples from a goat, a paw-paw and a quail for COVID-19 test, only for all three results to return positive (BBC News, 2020b; Great Game India, 2020). This had angered the president who kicked out the WHO officials from the country. In a controversial twist of the WHO's mandate which makes it serve as both medical and health adviser and a political body, the Burundi government found the WHO culpable in its intervention in COVID-19 crisis in the country. The Burundi government accused the WHO of its interference in the internal affairs of the country (Great Game India, 2020). Burundi had thus, sent official of the WHO packing from the country.

It is pertinent to note that in the face of these problems currently befalling the WHO amidst a pandemic, this is not the first time that the organisation is being accused of mishandling a pandemic. For instance, Kamradt-Scott (2020) avers that in 2009, the WHO was accused of acting too early to declare the Swine Flu a pandemic; whereas, in 2015, the organisation was accused of acting too late to declare Ebola outbreak a public health emergency. Nevertheless, amidst the ongoing criticisms against the WHO in its handling of the pandemic, including various threats of funding and membership withdrawal, there is also a perception that the health organisation has done well. Nature (2020: 431) observed that generally, 'leading public-health researchers and practitioners agree that, so far in the current crisis, the agency [WHO] has offered leadership and acted according to the evidence it has received.'

Finance Politics and Post Covid 19 WHO: Implications for Africa

The series of criticisms, threat of withholding funding and membership withdrawal in the middle of a pandemic, will certainly have adverse impact on the WHO's responses to COVID-19 (especially among poor and African countries), going forward, and its post-COVID activities. The evidence is there that the implosion of IOs by way of membership withdrawal and fund withholding by member-states, have adverse effects on such IOs (see von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2018; Brolmann, et al. 2018; Goetz & Patz, 2017; Hufner, 2017), but also on developing and African member states who rely heavily on them for assistance in periods of global emergency. If the WHO suffers implosion from the current

criticisms and threats arising from its handling of COVID-19, it is likely to suffer some consequences and challenges now and the post-COVID near future. Such consequences will be dire in the current circumstance where fund withholding and membership withdrawal threats are coming from among others, a major financier of the WHO- the US. The fact that the WHO has relied heavily on the US for over 15 to 20 percent of its annual budget (WHO, 2020c; Wolfson, 2020) will certainly mean a lot and adds to the organisation's current funding crisis, especially in the middle of a pandemic. When fund withholding and membership withdrawal threats are coming from a major financier, IOs should have something to worry about (Goetz & Patz, 2017). As such, given the WHO's over reliance on the US for funds, the organisation can hardly escape the erosion of its autonomy and the influence of the US. What seems glaring is that the US fears that it is losing its influence over the organisation to China whose contribution to the WHO is ten times short of what the US doles out to it annually. Caught in the middle of this geopolitics of the US and China, the WHO faces enormous challenges in its response to the pandemic and in pursuant of its mandate post-COVID-19, especially if it loses one of its major financiers in the United States. Our argument is that developing and African States will be most adversely affected by any possible implosion to the WHO. The table below shows the ten (10) largest member-state financiers of the WHO.

Table 1: Top Ten Largest Member-State Financiers of the WHO (2018/2019 Biennium)

S/N	Member-State	Funding Received by WHO (in US\$ Million)
1.	United States of America	853
2.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	464
3.	Germany	359
4.	Japan	234
5.	Kuwait	95
6.	Norway	93
7.	China	89
8.	Canada	87
9.	Sweden	87
10.	Republic of Korea	82

Source: WHO (2022b)

Funding cuts or membership withdrawal from the WHO in the middle of the COVID-19 would mean less resources availability to the organisation and it may need to reduce its staff strength by firing some staff and according to Kamradt-Scott (2020), the low and middle income countries of Asia, but specifically Africa will be most adversely affected. This is as funding previously available for such countries will suddenly become unavailable and inaccessible, thereby, resulting in loss of access to medications and health services, and increased deaths in those countries. The WHO's ability to coordinate international affairs around the pandemic will also suffer grave set back in the case the organisation suffers an implosion. The coordination of vaccine research and development, provision of technical expertise and assistance to African States' responses to contain the virus, and the procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE) for African health workers will be severely affected in the face of serious implosion of the WHO.

Generally, the WHO's ability to coordinate and respond to emergencies will suffer set back. As it stands, the WHO is currently overseeing over 35 emergency operations including measles and cholera outbreaks in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Yemen (Nature, 2020) and Ebola, and other health emergencies in some parts of Africa. This will no doubt, be negatively impacted should the WHO continue to receive threats or actual withholding of funding and membership withdrawal. WHO's efforts to treat, eradicate and study tuberculosis, and diabetes; polio; and tropical diseases most prevalent in Africa, will suffer set back amidst an implosion.

Specifically, the action by member-states and a major financier like the US to suspend its funding of the WHO in the middle of a global crisis as the COVID-19, has been described as a disaster for public health globally, but especially in Africa. The consequence is simply unimaginable, it is suicidal, and a destructive disengagement (Pai, 2020). Joanne Liu, a former president of Medecins Sans Frontieres, puts the consequences of withholding funds to the WHO in the middle of COVID-19 more succinctly that 'Pulling out financial support in the midst of the response to pandemic of the century is suicidal...It is as if, in a middle of a patient crashing in my ER [Emergency Room], someone from the hospital board of directors would come and cut off the oxygen flow' (Pai, 2020). Glassman and Datema (2020) identified consequences of US' withdrawal of membership from the WHO as less attention to disease control objectives which the US cares about; less cooperation and effectiveness in places of US strategic interest; and fewer US experts in global discussion.

The implosion of the WHO would also mean the fragmentation of global health authority which also poses threat to global response to future health challenges. Huang (2020) avers that the situation could 'set the world back a century, to pro-World War II times.' This will mean the emergence of depleted and regional health authorities which will respond independently and differently to global health challenges.

Furthermore, the eventual withdrawal of membership from such a powerful country as the US may further lead other US allies to follow suit. If such countries share the same opinion with the US that the WHO is mishandling COVID-19 responses; that it is not serving their interests; or if the US mounts pressure on them to withdraw membership (Huang, 2020), this

will lead to further depletion of the WHO, which does not augur well for the organisation and the globe, especially Africa.

Conversely, on a positive note, funds withholding from such a major and biggest financier as the US to the WHO, could liberate the organisation from the shackles of undue influence from big contributors. As Pai (2020) puts it, funds withdrawal especially from the US ‘provides the opportunity for other alliances of countries to reform the WHO, make it stronger and less dependent on one large contributor.’ This will indeed, pave the way for better resource diversification for the WHO. For instance, already, just after the US announced its temporary freeze of funding to the WHO, China pledged additional 30 million US dollars and another 2 billion US dollars to the fight against COVID-19 (Huang, 2020); Ireland quadrupled its contribution and Finland pledged additional 5.5 million Euros to the WHO’s Coronavirus purse (Glassman & Datema 2020).

Nevertheless, as von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2018) posit, States withholding funds and withdrawing membership of the WHO could also suffer some political loss. This is mostly correct for such a powerful State as the US. If the US eventually pulls out of the WHO, Huang (2020) argues that it will lose its seat at very important global table and could be isolated and have less influence on global affairs. This is even most likely as China is currently pulling so much weight in global geopolitics and making its presence felt globally. US’ allies and investors may also become sceptical of a state who cannot respect funding and membership commitments to the WHO (see for instance von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2018), and become reluctant to ally with the US. As Kamradt-Scott (2020) argues and rightly so, the US will lose its long term strategic interest of providing global leadership if the country eventually puts its threat of membership withdrawal from the WHO into action. For African countries whose health system is already in shambles, withdrawing membership from the WHO is at best, disastrous, as such African countries will lose out from the health expertise, assistance and resource support from the WHO. The consequence of this, is better not imagined.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The implosion of IOs by way of threat or actual withholding of funding and withdrawal of membership by member-states, is dangerous and will most definitely have severe effects on the IOs’ operations and the well-being of States, especially those of Asia and Africa. Likewise dangerous is the heavy reliance of IOs on one large contributor. The above scenarios are the critical positions which the WHO currently finds itself amidst a global pandemic. For years, the WHO has heavily relied on the US for both its assessed (mandatory)/Extra Budgetary Funds (EBFs) and voluntary (Extra Budgetary Funds (EBFs) funds. The two scenarios specifically puts the WHO in a critical and dicey position in the middle of a global pandemic.

In order to avert the identified impending doom for the WHO and Africa, we recommend the following:

- i. WHO must as a matter of exigency, take advantage of the current situation and further diversify its resource base. It must make conscientious efforts to move away from its dependence on one large contributor.
- ii. The WHO already has confidence issues among its members on its authority, credibility and capability to manage the COVID-19 effectively. This does not mean well for the organisation at this time. Hence, rather than being caught in blame game, the WHO must make frantic efforts to convince and reassure its members of its capacity to manage the COVID-19 in the most professional way. It must reinstate its seemingly lost confidence among members.
- iii. Member-states must know that it is the most dangerous thing to do to threaten or actually withhold funding and withdrawal membership from the WHO in the middle of a pandemic. Those nursing this should retract and cooperate with the WHO to contain the pandemic and reserve their grievances till post-COVID-19.
- iv. The WHO should admit its mistakes and take proactive steps to correct them. Both the WHO and member-states must make sincere efforts and commitments to ensure that the world does not decline into fragmentation of global health authority which would be devastating for health globally.
- v. Member-states, irrespective of size, wealth or current contributions to the WHO must come to the understanding that COVID-19 is a global challenge and that unless there is global cooperation to address it, no one country can safely stay free of the virus. Any implosion of the WHO is dangerous for the world's health system, especially that of Africa. Given the mutations and the new variants of the virus, the world must come together like never before to contain the virus, only then can the world be a safe and better place health-wise, now and post-COVID.

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